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Abstract
This paper uses the city level roll-out of legal service grants to evaluate their
effects on crime. Using Uniform Crime Reports from 1960 to 1985, the results
show that there is a short run increase of 7 percent in crimes reported and also a
13 percent increase in crimes cleared by arrest. Results show an increase in the
staffing of police officers in cities that received legal services. These cities are
also associated with having higher median property values 10 years later. This
supports the narrative that legal services changed police behavior through
litigation or threats of litigation.

Contact Information:
Department of Economics, Portland State University, 1721 SW Broadway, Portland,
Oregon 97201; jamein.cunningham@pdx.edu; (503) – 725 – 3934

Acknowledgements:
This project was generously supported by an NICHD center grant to the Population
Studies Center at the University of Michigan (R24 HD041028). I am grateful to
William Collins and Robert Margo for sharing the riot data for the 1964 to 1971
period. I am also grateful for helpful comments from Andrew Goodman-Bacon,
Martha Bailey, John Bound, Charlie Brown, Tanya Byker, Sheldon Danziger, Nic
Duquette, Thomas Ehrlich, John Gallup, Mary King, Patrick Mason, Ryan Monarch,
Sam Myers and Mel Stephens.

“Legal Services Lawyers have won the confidence of angry
young men and women and have channeled their
grievances into democratic procedures. This capability
and achievement mark a major victory for those concerned
with maintaining law and order.”
– From the Office of Economic Opportunity,
November 1969 Senate Hearing
“You can carry a machete through the streets of Newark
and not get locked up”
– Mr. Kowalewski, New York Times 1967
After decades of decline, reported crime in the United States began to rise
in the early 1960s. The rise in violent crime, especially homicide, pushed crime
to the forefront of political debates (Grimes & Loo 2004). Accompanying the rise
in crime, was a series of civil demonstrations that escalated into wide spread riots
during the summer of 1964.

Riots in Harlem, Rochester, and Philadelphia

presented political obstacles for launching President Johnson’s War on Poverty.1
Relatedly, the response of law and order to riots and rioters created more tension
between blacks in urban areas and local police officers (O’Reilly, 1988).
Concerns over the decline of urban communities and eruptions of urban violence
resulted in the inclusion of experimental programs within the War on Poverty that
would reduce the likelihood of riots.
In 1965 the Neighborhood Legal Services Program (LSP) was introduced
to provide the poor with legal channels to remediate grievances, especially those
resulting in riots (Gillette, 1996).2 Historically, the poor had limited access to
legal institutions due to financial constraints and discrimination. Many viewed
the lack of legal recourse produced demonstrations that escalated into riots in poor
1

Riots occurred in Harlem and Rochester in July of 1964 and in Philadelphia in August of 1964.
The Economic Opportunity Act was signed into law in August of 1964.
2
The Legal Services Program was not included in the initial introduction of programs under the
War on Poverty.
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black communities.

In response, the LSP was mandated to facilitate better

relationships between the bureaucracies and the poor that they affected.
The legal services program was introduced with an annual budget of 20
million dollars and by 1975 there existed over 600 offices with a budget over 70
million dollars. Although the size and scope of the program has gone through
many changes, it still exists as the Legal Services Corporation. As of 2013, there
are over 800 offices located in fifty states with an annual program budget of 365
million dollars.3

Donald Baker, chief counsel of the Office of Economic

Opportunity believed that the LSP would “have more impact on the total structure
of our social, economic, and political structures than anything else that OEO and
perhaps even the federal government has done on the domestic scene.”4
However, despite over 50 years of operations, little can be said about the actual
impact of the program. This is in part due to lack of data on the users of the LSP,
and to a greater extant, the lack of convincing measures of legal services
themselves. Pertinent questions remain to be answered: did the LSP mitigate the
urban decline that occurred as a result of racial riots in the 1960s? Did the LSP
improve the welfare of the poor?
This paper is the first to quantitatively evaluate the impact of the LSP on
the quality of life of the poor. I use newly collected data on the communities
receiving legal service grants between 1965 and 1975, and I focus on crime as a
measurement of quality of life for several reasons. First, crime captures actions
that negatively affect individual welfare, including threats to individual safety and
personal property. Second, crime is one of the few measures of well-being
consistently recorded over time at the city level for the period of interest. Lastly,
crime was an outcome linked to the LSP by advocates and opponents. In addition
to crime rates, I provide evidence of the impact of the LSP on other measures of
3
4

Information provided by the Legal Service Corporation 2013 Annual Report
See Gillette (1996)
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welfare, such as property values. Past literature has shown property values to be
negatively related to crime (Pope & Pope, 2010). More so, the evaluation of
property values sheds light on the influence of the legal service program on riots
and urban decline.
My research design takes advantage of the differential timing of the LSP
implementation in cities across the United States and uses a before and after
design to analyze changes in outcomes after the establishment of the LSP. I use
an event-study framework (Jacobson et al. 1993) which provides a statistical
description of the evolution of pre-trends in outcomes as well as the dynamics of
changes after the program began. My results show that there is a short run
increase in criminal offenses reported and offenses cleared by arrest after LSP
grants are received. Cities that receive LSP grants are associated with a 7 percent
increase in the number of crimes reported and a 13 percent increase in offenses
cleared by arrest 3 years after a grant is received. After 4 years, reported crime
and arrests decrease and evolve similarly to untreated cities.
These findings may reflect two different phenomena: an increase in actual
crime (consistent with critics and the second quote above) or an increase in the
reporting of crime (consistent with advocates and first quote above). Although it
is difficult to disentangle changes in crime versus changes in reporting, the eventstudy specification provides insight into the evolution of crime after the LSP was
established.

The intertemporal response of crime and arrest after LSP is

implemented displays an immediate increase in reported crime and arrest
followed by a large decrease in reported crime. This hump-shape response is
consistent with an increase in reporting followed by a decrease in actual crime.
This is similar to Levitt’s (1998) emphasis on changes in reporting behavior due
to changes in likelihood that a crime will be solved.

Second, there is an

immediate increase in the staffing of police officers in cities that received
federally funded legal services which has been shown to be inversely related to

3

crime (Levitt 1997, 2002, McCrary 2002, 2013). Third, consistent with changes
in police effort, I find that the increase in arrests is twice as large as the increase
in reported crime.
Additional evidence is also consistent with legal services programs
increasing social capital and improving welfare. I provide evidence of a positive
relationship between the LSPs and property values. Collin and Margo (2007)
showed that the median property values for black owned owners as well as all
residents within a city were negatively affected by the 1960s race riots. My
results support their finding as well as shows that places that received legal
services in the 1960s and 1970s had higher property values in 1980 relative to
cities that never received legal services. According to my results, race riots
decreased property values by 6 percent and legal service increased property
values by 3 percent. Furthermore, locations that received legal services earlier
had higher property values in 1980 relative to those that received legal services
later in the sample period. This final piece of evidence is consistent with LSPs
mitigating the consequences of riots that reduced the quality of life inner city
neighborhoods and contributed to improving the well-being of the poor.
Evaluations of social policies from the War on Poverty provides important
information about short and long term effect that can guide contemporary crime
and riot prevention policies. Citizens in poor communities historically have had
negative interactions with law enforcements and the Legal Service Program was a
policy intervention that had success with changing police and community
behavior. Equally important, the legal service program provides a unique case
study where a policy intervention provided impoverished groups additional
security or access by ensuring that their legal rights were protected. Intuitively,
this protection does not only work to correct market inefficiencies but also
increases demand for goods the poor previously lack access to. By increasing
access to welfare, housing, and proper police services, the poor indirectly benefits

4

from the reduction in the cost of lawyers. For example, one expression of market
inefficiency is the severe under reporting of crime. Myers (1980) finds that the
actual crime rates between 1970 and 1974 were 1.5 to 3 times larger than reported
crime. If some criminal offenses are under-reported due to lack of institutional
responsibility or the victim perception of institutional responsibility, legal services
would work to increase the number of crimes reported.5

Furthermore, the

evaluation of the legal service program does not only provide an historical
application of public policy but also fits into a larger literature in economics of
evaluating social programs from the Great Society (Almond, Hoynes, and
Schanzenbach 2011; Bailey and Goodman-Bacon 2013; Hoynes and Schanzebach
2006; Ludwig and Miller 2007).
I. Brief History of Legal Services Under the War On Poverty
A. Empowerment of the Poor through Legal Services
The Federal Legal Services Program was motivated by an influential
journal article by Jean and Edgar Cahn, which called for the “civilian perspective”
to be incorporated in the War on Poverty (Cahn & Cahn, 1964). The Cahns’
proposal was concerned with the potential of large bureaucracies generating
monopoly power, concluding that the only way to protect the true interest of the
poor was to provide them with accessible legal representation. Giving the poor
the ability to criticize, dissent, and compel responsiveness of local institutions
would allow the poor to participate in helping themselves.
The Cahns’ proposed that university-affiliated, neighborhood law firms be
established to serve as intermediaries between the community and those
administering social programs. The law firms would provide professionals to aid
in developing and stimulating leadership through opportunity, orientation, and
5

Legal services lawyers have been seen as improving relationships between the community and
the police. Many encounters of how the LSP have influenced behavior of local institutions are
documented in congress subcommittee meetings between 1965 to 1974.
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training. Each law firm would be staffed with lawyers, research assistants, and
investigators with the goal of making public officials and private businesses more
responsive to the needs of the poor. Legal representation would be available for
divorce, eviction, welfare fraud, police brutality, installment buying, and
destroying the momentum of a “militant community effort.”6

The Cahns’

proposed that neighborhood law firms provide legal advocacy and legal analyses
in four arenas: traditional legal assistance, law reform, law advocacy, and
community outreach.
Largely in response to the Cahns’ ideas, the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO) launched the Neighborhood Legal Services Program as part
of the Community Action Program (CAP). Federal legal services grants went
directly to community organizations and excluded local and state authorities,
allowing federal funds to be spent rapidly. The OEO delegated the choice of
whether a local legal aid organization would run a Legal Services Project to local
Community Action Agencies (CAA).

7

Implicitly, location and timing of these

grants also were dependent on local political pressure and support from the local
bar association. Often, differences between the CAA and local bar associations
generated confusion about where and when LSPs were established. Once the
National Bar Association fully backed the LSP, there was a greater effort to fund
as many legal services grants as possible.8 This process, in which local bars and

6

The deterrence of “militant community effort” refers to the availability of a lawyer to provide
avenues for differences between the poor and various entities to use the political and judicial
establishments to solve problems peacefully. Proponents of Federally Funded Legal Services
often boast of their success with ending or resolving differences that resulted in riots.
7
The OEO was responsible for the antipoverty programs and one of the largest initiatives was the
Community Action Programs (CAP). Community Action Programs are the bread and butter of the
Anti-poverty movement.
8
It took two years for federally funded legal services to be fully operational due to opposition
from local bar associations. The American Bar Association pledged full cooperation on February
8, 1965.
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community action agencies influenced funding, resulted in a wide time variation
of the establishment of the LSP in various cities (Johnson, 1974).
The first year of legal services under OEO resulted in over 155 grants
being issued. The annual budget during the first year was 20 million, an amount
that steadily increased each fiscal year.

In the second year, the budget for

federally funded legal services was double the budget of the legal aid societies
affiliated with the National Legal Aid Defender Association. In 1967, the legal
services program doubled in size, issuing over 300 grants with a budget of over
40 million dollars. By the end of 1967, the Federal LSP was funding 250 projects
and providing legal assistance in 48 states.
To gain a better understanding of how legal services funds were utilized,
during the 1968 fiscal year a total of 282,000 cases were accepted.

Cases

involving family problems – i.e. divorce, nonsupport, and paternity – represented
nearly 40 percent of the cases. Criminal and juvenile cases were responsible for
over 18 percent of the cases.9 Administrative cases, which include cases that
challenge laws and policies for welfare recipients and low skilled workers,
accounted for only 7 percent of the total cases but were very effective. A single
administrative case potentially affected thousands of residents in a city, state, or
across the country.

These cases usually involved challenging governmental

agencies such as state and local welfare, social security, workman’s
compensation, and unemployment insurance.

It must also be noted that

neighborhood law firms could have had many indirect effects. The availability of
legal assistance may result in changes in business practice, educational
disciplinary responses, and police policies even without litigation or long after
litigation is resolved.
B. Federally-Funded Legal Services and Crime
9

See Levitan (1969) for more information on the utilization of legal service grants.
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The OEO funded neighborhood law firms were responsible for providing
legal assistance in civil cases for individuals who were unable to afford private
attorneys. Legal representation in criminal matters was provided by the state,
however, these services were not always deemed as high quality. 10 Legal services
lawyers provided some form of legal assistance for alleged criminals when
lawyers deemed that the state could not adequately represent clients with
compelling cases.

Also, LSP lawyers were often called upon to provide

pamphlets or information concerning citizen’s legal rights when interacting with
the police.
In addition, opponents of the program often criticized attorneys for
inciting riots and emboldening criminals by providing them with legal counsel.
Police officers in Newark and Los Angeles accused LSP lawyers of organizing
demonstrations and creating civil unrest. Legal Services in Venice, California
was accused by local police officers of “supporting anti-police militants” and
organizing citizens into “revolutionary forces”.

Legal services in Chicago

petitioned for pardons for citizens involved in riots in 1968. Senator Murphy of
California accused the California Rural Legal Services Agency of representing
known criminals. Aligned with this was the narrative that, if LSP lawyers were
successful at representing alleged criminals or improving the “quality” of
criminals, crime would increase in these cities due to the lack of arrests and
convictions. 11
Another mandate of the LSP was to build community relationships with
public institutions such as the police department. Within this mandate to LSPs,
public institutions were to be held responsible for services rendered on behalf of
10

Gideon v Wainwright (1963) ruled that state courts are required to provide an attorney for
criminal defendants who were unable to afford an attorney from a private law firm.
11
This was often a discretionary decision with local political consequences. Lawyers were
compelled to represent clients when they felt the state would not adequately provide a proper
defense for someone the lawyer deemed innocent or wronged by the police.
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the poor. Most legal services cases in this arena were dealt with by conferences,
threats of litigation, and educating clients of legal rights and procedures. For
example, legal services lawyers in Los Angeles brought a lawsuit on behalf of the
black community against the Los Angeles Police Department citing them with
illegal police behavior and harassment. Similar lawsuits were filed in Cleveland,
Washington D.C, and Camden. The goal of these lawsuits were to change police
practices, implement training in areas of race and poverty, and for recruitment of
more officers - particularly minority police officers. Also in New York, Legal
Services filed suit against the New York Police Department on behalf of twelve
women who were victims of domestic violence. The objective of the lawsuit was
to enforce the requirement that local police officials follow laws and procedures
for domestic violence cases that were already in place. Similar motions were
made on behalf of domestic violence victims from legal services agencies in
Florida, California, Oregon, and Vermont. Advocates of the program claimed
that LSP lawyers were influential in reducing police brutality, improving police
response time, and securing the actual filing of police reports. Legal services
lawyers, though representing cases against Police Departments, often worked in
concert with local police officers; these relationships were credited with reducing
the likelihood of riots by using the judicial system to solve disputes peacefully.
Conceptually, the availability of legal aid would serve as a deterrent for
unfair or unjust treatment by police authorities (i.e., police brutality or not taking
reports).12 If police services were underutilized by the poor due to social and
political structure or resources, LSPs would attempt to correct the market
inefficiency. The examination of the victimization reports and reported crime
records reveals a distinct difference between the actual and observed crime rate.

12

During a 1969 Senate hearing, advocates of LSP boast on the effectiveness of legal service
lawyers to intervene in riots, decrease police brutality, reduce illegal police conduct, and increase
the relationship between the police and the poor community.

9

Boggess and Bound (1999) summarized the differences between Victimization
Reports and the Uniform Crime Report and surmised that reporting plays a large
role in the discrepancy. According to Boggess and Bound, the large difference
reflects reporting behavior of victims and witnesses as well as reporting behavior
of the police.13 There are several reasons why this difference between actual and
reported crime occurs. First, the pecuniary gains from reporting are likely small if
the possibility of recovery is near zero. Also, the victim or observer of a crime is
not likely to report if the criminal is of close relation or if retaliation is possible.
Additionally, political pressure to keep crime rates down, the social economic
status of victims, conviction rates, and various other reasons cause crime to go
unreported.14

If some criminal offenses are under-reported due to lack of

institutional responsibility or the victims perception of lack of institutional
responsibility, legal services could work to increase the number of crimes
reported and the number offenses cleared by arrest.15
According to the mechanisms outlined above, the introduction of the LSP
has two possible implications within a Becker type crime model. For potential
criminals (supply-side), the LSP increases the quality of criminals and as a result,
decreases the marginal cost of committing a crime.

Consequently, this will

decrease the number of crimes cleared by arrest, increase the number of crimes
committed, and increase the number of crimes reported.

For non-criminals

(demand for crime prevention), the LSP could improve police-community
relationships which increases the reporting of crime. Better policing and more
13

Myers (1980) finds that the actual crime rates between 1970 and 1974 were 1.5 to 3 times larger
than reports.
14
Couzens and Sieidman (1974) discuss how the production of crime rates depends on the victim
perspective, the police perspective, and also political pressure. Unobserved differences in any of
these three areas can cause crime to be drastically under-reported across cities and vary over time.
Also see Black (1970).
15
Legal services lawyers have been seen as improving relationships between the community and
the police. Many encounters of how the LSP have influenced behavior of local institutions are
documented in congress subcommittee meetings between 1965 to 1974.

10

reporting would also lead to an increase in arrests which serves as a deterrent for
committing future crimes.
Combining the two offsetting effects, the prediction that follows is that
LSPs could increase or decrease crime after legal services grants were received.
Furthermore, both of these changes in crime would result in an increase in
reported crime. However, what is important from a social capital perspective is
whether actual crime increased or decreased due to the establishment of LSPs.
My analysis uses property values to shed light on this.
II. Data On Legal Service Grants and Crime
Data on the recipients of federal legal services grants funded by the OEO
were compiled from the National Archives Community Action Program
(NACAP) files. NACAP provides information on the city, county, and state for
which the funds were received and the targeted communities. Also, provided is
the date the grant was issued, the amount of the grant, and a brief description for
the intended purpose of the grant. I use this information to match legal services
grants to city level observations on crime and I use the date of the first grant to
identify when the legal services program started.16
Data on crime comes from the Uniform Crime Reporting: Offenses
Known and Clearance by Arrest (UCR). The data on crime includes monthly
information on the number of unfounded offenses, actual offenses, offenses
cleared by arrest, and offenses cleared involving individuals under the age of 18.
The following offenses of interest are recorded in this database: murder and
manslaughter, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle thefts.
Also recorded is the number of offenses cleared by arrest for each of these
criminal offenses.

16

NACAP files do not provide information for grants received in 1969. Data from Federal
Outlays are used to supplement CAP data to provide grants in 1969.
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City characteristics in this analysis are taken from the 1960, 1970, 1980,
and 1990 Census City and County Books.

The city level demographic

information is constructed by linearly interpolating between the 1960, 1970, 1980,
and 1990 census. To calculate the proportion of the population that are males
between the ages of 15 to 24 and 25 to 39 for each city, I interpolated the 1960
census county age profile to 1968 and used annual county age profiles from the
Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) from 1968-1985.

The analysis consists of city level observations with crime statistics and
census demographic information from 1960 to 1985 for 606 cities. All cities in
this sample have a population of over 25,000 residents in every year. Table 1
reports summary statistics for these cities from the 1960 census. The average
population in the sample is 98,515 residents with the median income of $6,004
dollars ($48,019 in 2014 dollars).17 The final sample contains 208 cities that
received legal services grants (treatment group) and 398 non grant cities
(comparison group).

Cities that received legal services grants have a larger

proportion of residents who are non-white and smaller proportion of residents
with more than 12 years of schooling which is reflected with lower median
incomes. However, cities that received grants are similar to unfunded cities with
regard to the proportion of residents who are men and between the ages of 15 to
24 and 25 to 39, a key determinant of crime (Blumstein and Rosenfeld, 2008).
III. Event-Study Methodology
The empirical strategy will take advantage of the variation in the location
of LSPs. Although there are key cross-sectional differences between funded and
unfunded cities, the identification strategy is dependent on how crime evolves
before the establishment of the legal services program. Table 2 reports summary
17

LSPs were located in larger cities, however, 103 of the 208 cities that received LSP grants had a
population less than 100,000 residents in 1960 and 45 cities had a population less than 50,000.
Every city with a population greater than 500,000 residents in 1960 received a legal service grant.
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statistics for the log of criminal offenses available in the UCR between 1960 and
1964.18 According to the table, cities that received legal services grants have
much higher average crime rates before 1965.

This is not surprising as

demographic characteristics from table 1 are known predictors of crime.
Important for my research design, however, is that crime evolved similarly in
treated and untreated cities prior to 1965. This is consistent with changes in the
percentage of the population in high crime age groups evolving similarly over
time in treated and untreated places. My analysis will account for the crosssectional differences by using city fixed effects to capture differences in cities that
are unobservable but are constant over time. Untreated cities in this analysis will
help estimate how crime is evolving over time and provide a comparison group
for how crime is expected to evolve after treatment. The untreated cities in this
sample provides a plausible comparison group if demographic characteristic as
well as city and year fixed effects capture the difference in how crime evolves in
treated cities versus untreated cities before the establishment of legal services
programs.

A test of this assumption is embedded within the difference-in-

difference approached used in this analysis. If crime evolves similarly in treated
and untreated cities before the establishment legal services program, my analysis
will capture any trend break in crime due to the introduction of legal services.
The empirical strategy will also take advantage of the variation in the
timing of the establishment of LSPs. The key identifying assumption is that the
timing of the establishment of LSPs is uncorrelated with other determinants of
changes in crime. The first test of this assumption is a regression of 1960
demographic characteristics that are determinants of crime on the year LSPs was
established. The LSP was also supposed to be affiliated with university law

18

Summary statistics are the average over 1960 to 1964 of offenses reported.
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programs; so ex ante, one would predict that legal services would be in cities that
have law schools.
Table 3 reports weighted and unweighted estimates from ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions for the year grants were received. I use an indicator
variable equal to one if a city is located in a county that has a law school and
another indicator variable for if the county has a medical school. The medical
school indicator captures the effect of a university versus a stand-alone law
school. This can distinguish whether timing of grants are affiliated with law
schools or large universities. Column 1 reports estimates from an unweighted
OLS regression and column 2 reports from a weighted OLS regression (weighted
by 1960 county population).19 In both columns, having a medical school or law
school is associated with receiving legal services earlier. However, having a
medical school in the county is not statistically significant. Law schools are
weakly statistically significant in column 2. According to table 3, demographic
characteristics fail to predict when a city first received a grant.
A second test of the identifying assumption is to compare the timing of the
LSP with the pre-program reported crime rates and pre-program growth in
reported crime. Figure 1 plots the changes in log of total crime from 1960 to
1964 and the reported crime in 1964 against the year of the LSP establishment.
Both figures show that the timing of the LSP is uncorrelated with reported crime
or changes in reported crime in the pre-period.20

These two tests provide

statistical evidence that the variation in the timing of establishing LSPs were not
determined by pre-period crime rates or predictors of crime.

19

Weights are used to give more weight to cities that contribute more the population descriptive
statistics used in the regression analysis.
20
The slope in panel A is -0.011 (0.0073) and panel B -0.0249 (.02082). The slope for panel A &
B are from univariate regressions of the crime on the year LSPs were established.
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Legal services programs were rolled out over an 11 year interval. 21 I use
the variation in the timing and location of funding within an event-study
framework to test for causality. The event study framework lends itself well for
testing the effects of an outcome before and after exposure to the treatment and
provides another falsification test for how crime is evolving before treatment.22
The pre-treatment effects test whether changes in the outcomes occur before the
implementation of treatment. I estimate the effects of federally funded legal
services using the following linear regression:
(1.)

𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡,𝑠(𝑖) + ∑𝑞𝜏=1 𝜋−𝜏 𝐷𝑖 1(𝑡 − 𝑇 ∗ = −𝜏) + ∑𝑝𝜏=1 𝛿𝜏 𝐷𝑖 1(𝑡 − 𝑇 ∗ =
′
𝜏) + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the annual log number of offenses per 100,000 residents in city i in
year t (t= 1960, 1961,…1985); 𝛾𝑖 is a set of city effects which control for
unobservable city characteristics that are time invariant; 𝛼𝑡 is either a set of year
effects or state-by-year effects (𝛼𝑠(𝑖),𝑡 ). Year effects will absorb policies that will
impact crime nationally such as the 1972 Supreme Court case ruling capital
punishment cruel and unusual. State-by-year effects captures time-varying state
level changes such as the business cycle or policy changes (e.g. punishment,
enforcement) which may influence the supply of criminal activity.
The row vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 , consists of covariates from the 1960, 1970, 1980, and
1990 census, which I have linearly interpolated between census years.23 The
covariates are the proportion of the non-white population, the proportion of males
between 15 to 24 years of age, the proportion of males between 25 to 39 years of
21

Legal Services operated under the OEO until October of 1974 when it became the Legal Service
Corporation.
22
For other papers using event study framework see Bailey (2013), Jacobson et al (1993), Kline
(2010), and McCrary (2007).
23
Census information is gathered in the County and City Data Book and is publicly available at
the ICPSR website.
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age, percentage of population with more than 12 years of education, and family
median income. Because using the treatment may actually have an effect on the
controls, I estimate the regression with and without the covariates from the census
for robustness of the specification. 𝐷𝑖 is an indicator variable equal to one if the
city ever received federally funded legal services. 1(𝑡 − 𝑇 ∗ = −𝜏) is an indicator
variable equal to one if the observation year is – 𝜏 years from the date that the
legal services grant is received or 1(𝑡 − 𝑇 ∗ = 𝜏) is equal to one if the observation
year is 𝜏 years after the date legal services were first available. 1(𝑡 − 𝑇 ∗ = 0) is
omitted due to collinearity where 𝑇 ∗ is the funding year for the legal services
grant; q refers to the number of lags or years before legal services are funded, and
p is the lead or years after legal services are funded. To ensure the coefficients
are well estimated, event time for 𝜏 > 10 and 𝜏 < -5 are grouped into endpoints, q
= 6 and p = 11. The endpoint coefficients are not estimated using a balanced
sample of cities and will also give unequal weight to cities that receive federal
grants very early or late in the sample. These endpoints, therefore, are omitted
from the presentation of results.
In the sample, cities receive legal services grants between 1965 and 1975.
A balanced event panel using UCR data on criminal offenses from 1960 to 1985
will focus on five years before and ten years after federally funded legal services
are received. The coefficients of interest are 𝜋−𝜏 , which are pre-treatment effects,
and post-treatment effects 𝛿𝜏 . These estimates describe the dynamics of reported
crime in funded cities before and after legal services grants are received. If the
econometric model captures the pre-legal services evolution of the dependent
variable, the pre-treatment effects should be indistinguishable from zero. The
treatment effects, 𝛿𝜏 , is the average change in the difference in criminal offenses 𝜏
years after the city received the grant.

16

IV. Results
A. Using the Timing of First Grants to Identify Impact
Using the estimates from equation 1, I plot pre-treatment effects and posttreatment effects from a balanced panel. Figure 2 plots the estimates from three
different specifications of equation 1. Model 1 is plotted in the solid line with no
markers. It contains only city and year effects. Model 2 is plotted with a solid line
and circle markers and includes city and state by year effects. Model 3 also
includes city and state-by-year effects with additional city characteristics
interpolated from 1960 to 1985 using the 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 census data
and is plotted with square markers. I present 95-percent confidence intervals for
model 2 and 3 by dashed lines.

The confidence intervals are constructed from

heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered by city. The sample consists of
cities with population greater than 25,000 residents in every year but excludes
New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago. Presented are estimates where the
natural log of crime is the dependent variable 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 for equation 1. All regressions
are estimated using the 1985 population as weights to correct heteroskedasticy
related to city size in the error term.24
Figure 2 plots pre-treatment and post-treatment effects for federal legal
services grants on log of total criminal offenses reported per 100,000 residents.
Total crime is an unweighted aggregate of property crime and violent crime.
Property crime includes burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft, whereas
violent crime aggregates include murder, manslaughter, rape, assault, and
robbery. According to all three models, the point estimates for 𝜋−𝜏 are near zero
or slightly less than zero but statistically insignificant. After the first year of
operations, changes in offenses reported are positive and statistically significant.
24

Weighted least squares is used to make error term homoscedastic. New York, Chicago, and Los
Angeles are removed to avoid giving these cities enormous weight in addition to having cities to
compare them with.
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The log of actual offenses reported increases drastically over the next three years
and is statistically significant. Using model 3 estimates, total crime per 100,000
residents increases 7 percent three years after treatment. Three and four years
after treatment, total crime reported begins to decrease and eventually becomes
indistinguishable from zero. The results are consistent with buildup of services
within a community. After the grant is received, neighborhood legal services will
have to hire staff, build community support and rapport, while also accumulating
exposure.
Estimates in figure 3 are produced using weighted least squares and
exclude New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. These cities are excluded to avoid
giving them enormous weight.

More importantly, these cities lack a proper

comparison within the treated or control samples, which is important because
identification is dependent on both timing and location.25 Population weights are
used in my analysis to gain efficiency when error term has heteroskedasticity
related to city size.

However, weighted least squares (WLS) often lead to

estimates that are less efficient than ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates
(Haider, Solon, and Wooldridge, 2013). In my analysis, weighted least square
produces estimates of the pre-treatment effects that are smaller in absolute value
and have smaller t ratios than OLS estimates. Also post-treatment effects for
WLS regressions are larger than OLS estimates and have larger t-ratios. This is
consistent with WLS procedure capturing the pre-period trend in crime.26
B. Interpretation of the Impact of Federally Funded Legal Services
The availability of legal services is associated with a large increase in
crime as predicted under the context of Becker’s Crime Model. The hump shape
response indicates that there is an increase in crime followed by a decrease in
25

Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York receive legal service grants in 1966.
Estimates including New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles as well as OLS regression are
available upon request.
26
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crime after legal services became available. However, the hump shape response
does not distinguish between changes in actual crime or the reporting of crime.
On one hand, this result is consistent with LSPs increasing the demand for police
service and reducing the demand for crime. Advocates of the LSP boasted about
its effectiveness in reducing police brutality, minimizing or stopping riots,
increasing victim response time, and ensuring filing of police reports.
Improvements in these areas should enhance the relationship between the poor
and police. Ensuring police filed reports alone will increase the reported crime
rate without changes in criminal behavior. By protecting the poor’s legal rights to
adequate law enforcement protection and services, legal services could increase
the likelihood that a crime is reported and also increase the likelihood that the
report would be investigated. In general, these effects will not only lead to more
reporting but also increase the probability of arrest, given a criminal offense
occurred.
While the intertemporal response of reported crime provides evidence of
changes in reporting behavior, I cannot dismiss the possibility of changes in
criminal behavior. In part, the hump shape response is also consistent with an
increase in actual crime followed by a decrease in crime.

According to

opponents, LSP lawyers decreased the probability of arrest and conviction. The
combination of these effects could embolden criminals and result in more crimes
being committed. Although not articulated by opponents, the decrease in crime
could be a result of increased police effort to clear offenses by arrest. Despite the
conflicting view points, it is clear that the establishment of legal services
increased reported crime in treated cities.
C. Event-study results for Arrest and Number of Police Officers
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Figure 3 plots pre-treatment and post-treatment effects for log of arrest per
100,000 residents. 27 I have valid arrest data from 1963 to 1985; therefore, I only
have one year for the pre-treatment. As with reported crime, pre-treatment effects
are zero and post-treatment effects are positive and statistically significant. Worth
noting is the magnitude of arrest compared to reported crimes. In figure 2 total
criminal offenses reported increased by 7 percent after three years and then by the
fifth year after treatment, the effects were not distinguishable from zero. Here,
total arrests increased by 16 percent after three years and the post-treatment
effects remain high for the next couple of years before declining to zero. In this
case, the response to legal services and the increase in reported crime resulted in a
dramatic increase in arrests in treated cities. The percentage increase in arrests
after legal services become available is double the percentage increase in crimes
reported.
As mentioned earlier, legal services often filed laws suits which requested
additional police officers and a more diverse police force. Figure 4 plots pretreatment and post-treatment effects for the log of sworn police officers per
100,000 residents. Before legal services are available the pre-treatment effects
are zero. After legal services become available the log of sworn police officers
increases over the next 10 years relative to untreated cities. The post-treatment
effects, clearly shows a large immediate increase in the log of sworn police
officers after legal services are established.28 An increase of 2.2 percent in the
first year is the largest increase over the next ten years. The increase in sworn
police officers in the first year is an average increase of 8 additional police
officers in treated cities. Using estimates of police elasticities from research on
27

Mas (2006) also used clearance rates as a proxy for police performance. Here, by protecting the
rights of the poor, should also be reflected in more effort and energy to doing better police work.
Using clearance rates serves as a proxy.
28
Police employment data from the Annual Survey of Government provide results similar to the
estimates displayed in figure 4.
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crime and police from Levitt (1997, 2002) and McCrary (2002, 2013), this
implies that violent crime would be expected to be reduced by 6 to 14 crimes per
100,000 residents because of additional police officers. The reduction in property
crime would be between 25 and 94 crimes per 100,000 residents.
D. Event-study results by UCR crime category
Figure 5 plots pre-treatment effects and post-treatment effects from model
3 for the effect of legal services on property and violent crimes reported. Results
for property crime show that five years before federal legal services grants,
funded cities are indistinguishable from unfunded cities. According to Model 3,
the point estimates for 𝜋−𝜏 are zero or slightly less than zero but statistically
insignificant. Three years after federally funded legal services are implemented,
the number of crimes reported increased on average by 93 property crimes per
100,000. Three years after a city received a legal services grant, property crimes
continued to grow at a steady pace. Similar to property crimes, the pre-treatment
effects for reported violent crimes are not statistically significant. After the first
year of operations, changes in violent offenses reported are positive and increased
over the next 3 years.
Figure 6 plots pre-treatment and post-treatment effects for log of criminal
offenses reported per 100,000 residents for sub-categories of property and violent
crimes. Panel A displays the result for the log of murder per 100,000 residents.
The estimates show a steady increase in the log of murders reported before and
after treatment but the estimates never becomes statistically significant nor does it
display hump-shape response. After legal services begin, the log of rapes per
100,000 residents and the log of robberies per 100,000 residents reported increase
and are statistically significantly. Panel C and D plot treatment effects for assault,
burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. Pre-treatment effects for larceny are
positive and statistically different from zero. Post-treatment effects are positive
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and statistically different from zero after a few years. Motor vehicle theft and
burglaries post-treatments are positive, statistically different from zero, and
follow the hump shape response of total crimes.
Property and violent crimes, as well as total crime, responded in a similar
fashion to the establishment of legal services.

The post-treatment effects of

murder and manslaughter are not statistically significant which support the notion
that legal services increased reported crime and not actual crime. Murder and
manslaughter are reported fairly accurately and proxies for changes in actual
crime. The zero post-treatment effects for murder and manslaughter show that
LSPs were unlikely to increase actual crime. Also, crimes that are typically
under-reported, such as rape, display the largest increase. This is consistent with
an increase in reporting in places where legal services are established.
The notion that crime is decreasing while reporting is increasing is not
unique in the crime literature.29 Boggess and Bound (1997) showed that reported
crime increased in the UCR in the 1980’s while crime decreased according to the
National Crime Survey.30 They concluded that overall criminal activity decreased
by virtue of the fact that the murder rate declined over the sample period, while
reporting over the sample period increased.

Consistent with their story, my

results indicate that the impact of LSPs on murder and manslaughter are
statistically insignificant although the post-treatment estimates are positive.
However, other criminal categories that are reported somewhat accurately
indicate that crime may actually be increasing due to legal services.

Two

categories that are likely to be reported somewhat accurately are robberies and
29

Levitt (1998) makes a similar argument about the effect of police on the reporting of crime.
Levitt argues that an increase in police officers increases the likelihood that a crime is reported and
reduces that amount of actual crime that occurs.
30
National Crime Survey was implemented in 1972 to collect data on victimization. The data is
administered by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and available at the ICPSR. The NCS provides
information about crimes reported and not reported to the police as well as provides information
about the victim and the offender. The increase in reporting overtime is also substantiated by
Biderman and Lynch (1991).
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motor vehicle theft (Bogges and Bound, 1997; Levitt, 1998). According to figure
6, the post-treatment effects are positive and statistically significant. If LSPs are
improving reporting of crimes, it is reasonable to assume that murders and motor
vehicle theft would be unaffected. However, I find large effects for motor vehicle
theft and a positive effect on murder. It is quite possible that legal services are
associated with increases in actual crime or are associated with events that
increased crime.
V. Discussion
A. Legal Services and Property Values
Evidence thus far indicates that the establishment of legal services
programs increase reported crime.

These estimates imply that LSPs are

associated with an increase in reported crime of roughly 7 percent. Legal services
are also associated with an increase in arrest and the number of police officers in
treated cities. All together these results are consistent with legal services reducing
crime and increasing social capital by requiring citizens and public institutions to
become more responsible for community development. However, they may also
reflect an increase in crimes committed.
One attempt to distinguish between changes in actual crime versus
reported crime is to examine changes in the value of homes. Reducing crime will
make communities safer and consequently influence property values in treated
cities. Conversely, an increase in crime would reduce them. This is consistent
with Lynch and Rasmussen (2010) which showed that housing prices are highly
discounted in high crime areas. Also an increase in criminal activities or an
increase in the number of potential criminals can negatively influence the value of
homes (Coldwell, Dehring, and Lash; 2000; Linden and Rockoff; 2008). The race
riots of the 1960s have been linked to lower property values in 1980 by Collins
and Margo (2007). Lastly, Pope and Pope (2010) showed that there is a negative
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relationship between crime and property values.

They conclude that cities

displaying the largest decrease in crime in the 1990s also had the largest increase
in property values by the year 2000. If legal services decrease crime, the increase
in social capital should be reflected in the property value of homes. To test this
hypothesis I will use the median property value from 1960, 1970, and 1980
census as the dependent variable similar to Collins and Margo.
There is caution required in using the median property value as a measure
of welfare. In part, is likely that users of legal services were not home owners and
property value will not capture changes in the welfare of the poor. Additionally,
changes in the property value in high crime areas may not impact the value of
property in low crime areas or the median home owner. However, policing and
criminal activity is a city level statistic and can have spillover effects within a
city. Policing high crime areas and minimizing the opportunity for crime to
spread outside of high crime areas could be reflected in the median property value
of all home owners. Therefore, using median property value is a modest attempt
to estimate the causal effect of LSPs on the welfare of the poor and the
community as a whole.
To analyze the impact of LSPs on property values, I estimate the
following difference-in-difference regression:
(2)

′
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿𝐿𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 .

The dependent variable is the log of the median residential property value for all
home owners in city i in year t from 1960, 1970, and 1980 Decennial Census.
LSP is equal to 𝐷𝑖 1(𝑡 − 𝑇 ∗ > 0) which is an indicator variable that is equal to one
if a legal services project is operating in city i before census year t. The row
vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 , consists of covariates from the 1960, 1970, and the 1980 census. The
covariates are the natural log of the following: the proportion of the non-white

24

population, percentage of population with more than 12 years of education, and
the population per square mile. Also included is an indicator variable equal to
one if a riot has occurred in city i before census year t. The riot data comes
courtesy of Collins and Margo (2007). This data consists of detailed information
of riots occurring between 1964 and 1971.
Table 4 displays the results from equation 2 where the dependent variable
is the log of the median residential property value for all home owners. According
to column 1, property values are two percent higher in cities that receive legal
services. Column 2 adds additional covariates: the log of median income and log
of the percentage of the population with 12 or more years of education. Estimates
in column 2 further support that the impact of LSPs on property value is positive
and the results are larger and statistically significant. According to column 3,
cities that receive legal services earlier are associated with higher property values
in 1970 and 1980 relative to cities that did not receive legal services or receive
legal services later. Higher property values are consistent with LSPs increasing
social capital and making these communities safer and better off. The increase in
social capital through changes in reporting, according to advocates, was driven by
lawyers improving the relationship between the poor and institutions that
interacted with the poor.
To aggregate the effect of LSPs on property values, I use the same
procedure used in Collins and Margo. Using the estimated effects in column 2, I
predict the log-value of median property values in 1980 for each city. Using these
predicted values, I calculate a counterfactual for property values in treated cities
by subtracting the estimated value-added due to legal services. Using the number
of owner occupied housing in each city as weights, I calculate the weighted
average of property values in 1980 across cities to construct an average
counterfactual value of homes. The weighted average of property values in the
non-LSP counterfactual is $16,273. The weighted average of the actual property
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in 1980 is $17,370.

The difference between the actual and counterfactual

property values implies an additional $1,097 in property value due to the presence
of LSPs. The average number of owner occupied housing in 1980 across cities is
22,200. Using this number, legal services is associated with a 24 million dollar
increase in property values by 1980.
B. Using Rioting to Distinguish Changes in Reported Crime
It is reasonable to be concerned that the significant increase in reported
crime after exposure to federally funded legal services is a direct consequence of
riots that occur during this time period.31 The inclusion of year fixed effects will
capture national events that increase crime across cities. However, all riots are
not triggered by national events. Therefore, year fixed effects and state by year
fixed effects will not capture changes in local sentiments that may result in riots.
If the increase in reported crime is purely a consequence of rioting, then legal
services were either established in locations where rioting would occur or in
places where rioting was the most intense or severe.

Although riots are

considered spontaneous events (Collins & Margo 2007), it is likely that LSPs are
established in places where the tension between institutions and the
poor/minorities is high. As mentioned before, the program was considered an
anti-rioting initiative by advocates and thus selection on the likelihood of riots is
plausible but difficult to test.
To examine these concerns, I use riot data from Collins and Margo (2007).
Included this data is a riot severity index which compares riots across cities in the
sample. I use the riot intensity index to test how rioting effect my estimates.
Table 5 displays estimates for the log of total crime per 100,000 residents.
Column 1 includes estimates of model 3 from figure 3. Column 2 displays
31

According to data from Collins and Margo (2007), 409 riots are recorded in 193 cities in the
sample. Event-studies estimates show that riots are associated with higher level of crime after the
first riot in a city occurs. These estimates are not presented but are available upon request.
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estimates from model 3 including a variable for riot intensity in city j in year t.
Estimating the effect of legal services on total criminal offenses reported
accounting for rioting does not change the pre- and post-treatment effects. The
coefficient on rioting is positive and statistically significant but small. There are
various explanations why this occurs. One reason is that many of the riots in
Collin and Margo’s data are relatively small. Also, more intense riots may reflect
changes in national sentiment and are captured by year fixed effects. Lastly,
changes in crime could be a post-riot effect related to changes in demographics
and economic activity due to rioting.
C. Other War on Poverty Grants
Another reasonable concern is that any impact of the LSP is just a
reflection of other programs introduced in President Johnson’s War on Poverty.
The LSP operated within Community Action Agencies until 1969. The link
between legal services and community action agencies are not linear in the sense
that there are locations with legal services and without community action agencies
(and vice versa). Table 6 reports pre-treatment and post-treatment effects for the
Office of Economic Opportunity grants on log of total criminal offenses reported
per 100,000 residents. In column 1, the event is the timing of the first Head-Start
grant, column 2, uses Community Action Agency grants, and column 3 uses
Legal Services grants. Head-Start provides a placebo test since this program was
not linked to community action agencies. While the Community Action Agency
is a test of the litany of programs housed as Community Action Programs.
According to table 6, pre-treatment and post-treatment effects in columns 1 and 2
are not statistically significant. If changes in reported crime were due to the
influx of resources devoted toward fighting poverty and not legal services,
column 2 would show a significant decrease or increase in reported crime.
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However, reported crime only changes when the event is the establishment of the
legal service program.
VI. Conclusion
In 1960 many legislative acts and federal programs were implemented to
increase the quality of life of the poor, reduce poverty, and improve urban
communities. This declaration of reform is reflected in the War on Poverty
initiated in 1964 by President Lyndon B. Johnson. However, introducing social
programs such as Head Start and Job Corps was deemed too small according to
President Johnson. At Howard University's Commencement in 1965 he stated, “It
is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens must have the
ability to walk through those gates.” The LSP was established to equip the poor
with the tools to do just this. Fifty years later however, research has failed to
evaluate the impact of the LSP, partially because of the difficulty with quantifying
its effects.
Federally funded legal services attorneys are historically credited with
advocating on behalf of the poor to stop police brutality, increase response times
to victims, ensure that reports are filed and investigated, and change policing
policies. However, individuals that opposed the program identified it as an antigovernment program that emboldened criminals. My results are consistent with
its proponents rather than its opponents, showing the establishment of legal
services as increasing the demand for law enforcement services; also, that the
legal services program is associated with places having higher property values.
These results suggest that the LSP was impactful and this would have had primary
importance for individuals who could not articulate grievances before the program
began. Crime is one of many areas in which this program could have influenced
how public institutions interacted with the poor. Other implicitly affected areas
could include: welfare recipients, divorce, evictions, as well as changes in debt
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repayment which can greatly change an individual’s and a community’s economic
outlook.

This study as a whole indicates that the LSPs had far reaching

implication on the poor and urban communities.

Providing impoverished

communities advocates to articulate grievance can increase demand for underutilized goods as well as improve institutions that may be inefficiently servicing
the disadvantaged.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1. Crime Rates before the Legal Services Program Began
A. Δ in Log of Total Crime 1960-1964
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Notes: Panel A & B: Regression coefficients and predicted values are from univariate regressions
of the dependent variable crime on the year LSPs were established. The slope in panel A is -0.011
(0.0073) and panel B -0.0249 (.02082).
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Figure 2. Estimates of the Effects of LSP on Log of Total Crimes
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Figure 3. Estimates of the Effects of LSP on Log of Total Arrest
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Notes: Figures 2 & 3: Model 1 includes City, C, and year, Y, effect. Model 2 include city and
state-by-year, S-Y, effects. Model 3 adds covariates from county and city data book, X, to model
2. Covariates include median household income, percentage of population under age of 5,
percentage of the population over the age of 64, percentage of population nonwhite, and the
percentage of population with 12 or more years of education, which are from the decennial census.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by city are presented for model 2 & 3. Each
regression is weighted by 1985 population and excludes New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles.
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Figure 4. Estimates of the Effects of LSP on Log of Sworn Police
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02

-5

-3

0
-1
-0.02

1

3

5

7

9

-0.04

Model 1: C & Y
-0.06

Model 2: C & SxY

Model 3: Model 2 + covariates

Figure 5. Estimate of the Effects of LSP on Log Property and Violent Crime
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Figures 4 & 5: Model 1 includes City, C, and year, Y, effect. Model 2 include city and state-byyear, S-Y, effects. Model 3 adds covariates from county and city data book, X, to model 2.
Covariates include median household income, percentage of population under age of 5, percentage
of the population over the age of 64, percentage of population nonwhite, and the percentage of
population with 12 or more years of education, which are from the decennial census.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by city are presented for model 2 & 3. Each
regression is weighted by 1985 population and excludes New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles.
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Figure 6. Estimates of the Effects of Legal Services Grants on Log Crime Per 100,000 Residents
A. Murder
B. Rapes and Robbery
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Notes: Regression analysis include city and state-by-year fixed effects as well as median household income, percentage of population under age
of 5, percentage of the population over the age of 64, percentage of the non-white population, and the percentage of population with 12 or more
years of education, which are from the decennial census. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by city are presented. Each
regression
is
weighted
by
the
1985
population
and
excludes
New
York,
Chicago,
and
Los
Angeles.
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Table 1. Characteristics of Cities from 1960

A. 1960 City Characteristics
Means
Population
Population per square mile
Median Income
Proportion of population in cities
in Northeast
in Midwest
in South
in West
Proportion of residents
men between 15 and 24 years of age
men between 25 and 39 years of age
Nonwhite
with 12 years of education

Non-Grants
Cities

All Cities
(N=606)

Received
Grant from
1965-1975
(N=208)

98,515
6,662
6,004

190,585
7,525
5,868

50,397
4,958
6,273

22.0
30.7
29.9
17.4

23.7
29.6
28.7
18.0

18.6
33.0
32.2
16.2

6.6
10.0
12.9
43.2

6.5
10.0
14.4
41.5

6.7
10.0
10.1
46.7

(N=398)

Source: Table displays weighted averages from the 1960 Decennial Census.
Census data from 1962 County and City Data Book publicly available at the
ICPSR.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for UCR Data
Criminal Offenses
1960-1964

All Cities
(N=606)

Received
Grant from
1965-1975
(N=208)

222
10
13
110
82
2,829
724
1,773
333
3,041

505
23
25
252
205
5,891
1,543
3,585
763
6,396

59
4
6
35
17
1,230
295
827
108
1,288

0.590
0.294
0.295

0.644
0.267
0.285

0.562
0.308
0.299

Mean Per 100,000 Residents
Violent Crimes
Murder
Rape
Assault
Robbery
Property Crime
Burglary
Larceny
Motor vehicle theft
Total
Growth from 1960 to1964
Violent Crimes
Property Crime
Total

Non-Grants
Cities
(N=398)

Source: Table averages are from the UCR from 1960 to 1964. Criminal
offenses reported in the UCR are from the Uniform Crime Report
Offenses Known and Cleared. UCR data are publicly available at the
ICPSR.
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Table 3. The Relationship between First Legal Services Grants and the 1960
Census Demographics
(1)
(2)
Dependent Variable:
Year of first federal legal service grant
Law School in County
Medical School in County
median income
population per square mile
Proportion of residents
with 12 years of education
non-white
men between the age of 15 and 24 years of age
men between the age of 25 and 39 years of age

Weighted
State fixed effects
Observations
R-squared

-0.353
[0.307]
-0.209
[0.285]
1.848
[1.606]
-0.363
[0.234]

-0.664*
[0.345]
-0.0757
[0.286]
1.346
[1.608]
-0.164
[0.180]

0.369
[0.834]
-0.260
[0.193]
1.072
[0.757]
-0.189
[1.967]

0.702
[0.671]
-0.168
[0.210]
0.562
[0.766]
0.0160
[2.148]

X
208
0.468

X
X
208
0.494

Note: Each column reports estimates from a separate linear regression. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are corrected for clustering with state and presented in brackets. Independent
Variables are from the 1960 Decennial Census. Columns 1 & 2 use the 1960 population as
weights. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4. The Relationship between Legal Services and Property Values
(1)
(2)
(3)
DV: Log of Median Residential Property Value for All Home Owners
Legal Service Program
Riot

-0.00169
[0.0179]
-0.0943***
[0.0250]

0.0388**
[0.0150]
-0.0421**
[0.0183]

Time Since LSP Established
The Natural Log of
Median Income

1.283***
[0.123]

1.305***
[0.121]

0.0612*
[0.0352]
0.0740*
[0.0417]

-0.589***
[0.0939]
0.118***
[0.0235]
0.106***
[0.0237]

-0.614***
[0.0922]
0.122***
[0.0232]
0.108***
[0.0231]

1,818
0.502
606

1,818
0.668
606

1,818
0.671
606

% of pop with 12 years of
education
% of pop Nonwhite
Population per square mile

Observations
R-squared
Number of Cities

-0.0468***
[0.0166]
0.00357***
[0.00130]

Notes: Table display least-squares estimates obtained from estimating equation
2. The dependent variable is the log of the median residential property value for
all home owners provided in the City and County Data Books from 1962, 1972,
and 1983. Covariates are also from the City and County Data Books. Riot
indicator variable is based on data from Carter and Margo (2007). All
regressions include year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
clustered by city are presented beneath each estimate in brackets. Each
regression is weighted by 1985 population and excludes New York, Chicago,
and Los Angeles. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5. Event Study Estimates for Log of Total Crime with Riot Intensity
(1)
(2)
DV: Total Crime per 100,000 Residents
Years Before Treatment
-5
0.00502
0.00558
[0.0180]
[0.0181]
-4
0.00439
0.00487
[0.0153]
[0.0153]
-3
0.0119
0.0119
[0.0145]
[0.0146]
-2
-0.00381
-0.00397
[0.0117]
[0.0118]
-1
-0.0157*
-0.0150*
[0.00837]
[0.00858]
Years After Treatment
1
0.0381***
0.0328***
[0.0111]
[0.0118]
2
0.0528***
0.0515***
[0.0125]
[0.0125]
3
0.0724***
0.0719***
[0.0166]
[0.0168]
4
0.0611***
0.0611***
[0.0188]
[0.0189]
5
0.0414**
0.0414**
[0.0201]
[0.0202]
6
0.0216
0.0217
[0.0224]
[0.0224]
7
0.0154
0.0155
[0.0234]
[0.0234]
8
0.000119
0.000154
[0.0257]
[0.0257]
9
-0.00746
-0.00747
[0.0278]
[0.0278]
10
-0.00191
-0.00192
[0.0272]
[0.0272]
Riot Intensity

0.00202***
[0.000623]

Observations
R-squared
Number of cities

15,756
0.887
606

15,756
0.887
606

Notes: Table display weighted least-squares estimates obtained from estimating equation 1. Column 1
corresponds to model 3. Column 2 includes a Riot intensity variable is based on data from Carter and Margo
(2007). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by city are presented beneath each estimate in
brackets. . *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6. Event Study Estimates for Log of Total Crime by OEO Grant
(1)
(2)
(3)
DV: Log of Total Crime per 100,000 Residents
Years Before Treatment
-5
0.0275
0.0373
0.00502
[0.0242]
[0.0223]
[0.0180]
-4
0.0242
0.0217
0.00439
[0.0205]
[0.0185]
[0.0153]
-3
0.0169
0.0151
0.0119
[0.0163]
[0.0155]
[0.0145]
-2
0.0108
0.0155
-0.00381
[0.0118]
[0.0116]
[0.0117]
-1
-0.00136
-0.00300 -0.0157*
[0.00782] [0.00725] [0.00837]
Years After Treatment
1
0.00401
-0.00713 0.0381***
[0.00744] [0.00752] [0.0111]
2
0.00998
-0.00137 0.0528***
[0.0119]
[0.0112]
[0.0125]
3
0.0149
0.00741 0.0724***
[0.0153]
[0.0146]
[0.0166]
4
0.0224
0.00868 0.0611***
[0.0191]
[0.0182]
[0.0188]
5
0.0249
0.00600
0.0414**
[0.0224]
[0.0210]
[0.0201]
6
0.0264
-0.00233
0.0216
[0.0248]
[0.0235]
[0.0224]
7
0.0141
-0.0114
0.0154
[0.0266]
[0.0257]
[0.0234]
8
0.00125
-0.0249
0.000119
[0.0286]
[0.0276]
[0.0257]
9
-0.00722
-0.0327
-0.00746
[0.0300]
[0.0287]
[0.0278]
10
0.000896
-0.0404
-0.00191
[0.0314]
[0.0299]
[0.0272]
OEO Grants
Observations
R-squared
Number of cities

Head Start

CAA

LSP

15,756
0.858
606

15,756
0.858
606

15,756
0.887
606

Notes: Table displays least-squares estimates obtained from estimating equation 1. Column 1 uses
the first Head-Start Grant as the event while Columns 2 and 3 uses the first Community Action
Agency and Legal Services Program as the event respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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